






Can a Computer Have a Religious Experience?
Abstract
A religious experience is a phenomenological occurrence which is interpreted by the perceiver in such a way as to affirm or strengthen the belief in a higher being or the beliefs of a particular religion. Religion and, therefore, religious experiences are primarily mental constructs. Computational theory of mind provides the strongest capabilities of applying mental activities to computers. However, cognitive science and philosophy needs to establish the link between beliefs and physical states in order for computational theory of mind to be truly effective. There is also an issue with the semantic concepts associated with religion and religious experience. The problem of semantics has plagued computational theory of mind for years, and the issue has yet to be truly resolved. Computational theory of mind does, however, have the power to establish the causal link between the mental activities and the physical manifestations of a religious experience. I conclude that there is not strong enough evidence to currently support the hypothesis that a computer could have a genuine religious experience. 
Introduction
	This paper grew out of a conversation that I had with a friend recently. We were discussing the various aspects of philosophy and intention, and their relationship to artificial intelligence, when he asked the very question I hope to investigate. The question struck me in an odd way. Could it be possible for a computer to have a genuine religious experience? My head reeled with the possibilities of robot religions, holidays, belief systems, and religious texts. The only answer that I could give my friend was along the lines of, “I'll have to get back to you on that”. Since then the question has plagued me. The implications of the answer touch on religion, science, semantics, computation, and the nature of mind. I quickly decided that the answer must come from a philosophic investigation of religious experience in humans and proceed toward mapping such experiences onto computers. I do not intend this essay to be a complete analysis of the topic, but rather a starting point for future conversations. What I do intend to do is provide a definition of a religious experience and use this definition to develop arguments which expose the weaknesses of computational theory of mind (CTM). These weaknesses should not be taken as refutations. I think that CTM presents very strong arguments regarding the mind, and it is clear from the successes of artificial intelligence and robotics that it is on the right track. However, to develop true artificial intelligence all issues must be accounted for, and hopefully, with more research in cognitive science, solved. 
	Part I of the paper introduces my definition of religious experience and begins to address some of the issues with defining religious experience in humans. Part II is an explanation of religion's relationship to psychology and my reasons for utilizing CTM to develop my paper. Part III delves into the philosophy of belief and its issues in relation to CTM. Part IV is a discussion about  semantics and computers. Here, I use Searle's infamous “Chinese Room Argument” to address the semantic/syntactic gap in CTM. In Part V, I address the problem of causation, which is where CTM has a positive contribution to the issue of computers and religious experience. Each section discusses the particular issues as they apply to humans and the issues that are raised in mapping these topics to computer processes. Finally, Part VI contains my conclusions that have been drawn from the previous sections of the paper. I chose this topic because it provided me an opportunity to explore several interesting areas of philosophy and develop an argument around a well debated topic.  
I. A Short Dialog
JULES: I just been sittin' here thinkin'.
VINCENT: About what?
JULES: The miracle we witnessed.
VINCENT: The miracle you witnessed.  I witnessed a freak occurrence.
JULES: Do you know that a miracle is?
VINCENT: An act of God.
JULES: What's an act of God?
VINCENT: I guess it's when God makes the impossible possible.  And I'm sorry Jules, but I don't think what happened this morning qualifies.
JULES: Don't you see, Vince, that shit don't matter.  You're judging this thing the wrong way.  It's not about what.  It could be God stopped the bullets, he changed Coke into Pepsi, he found my fuckin' car keys.  You don't judge shit like this based on merit. Whether or not what we experienced was an according-to-Hoyle miracle is insignificant.  What is significant is I felt God's touch, God got involved. (Tarantino and Avery, “Pulp Fiction”) 
	Jules and Vincent are discussing the very thing that lies at the heart of this portion of my essay. What is a religious experience? My definition is a little more formulated than Vincent's. I will take a religious experience to be a phenomenological occurrence which is interpreted by the perceiver in such a way as to affirm or strengthen the belief in a higher being or the beliefs of a particular religion. 
	Now that I have a working definition of a religious experience, it is possible to discuss some of the qualities of religious experience. Religious experiences are personal in nature and powerful in their effect on the individual. As the dialog suggests, interpretation is in the eye of the beholder. Because I have to take a stand on this eventually, I will address an issue now. I do not believe that a person can have a religious experience of a system in which they do not believe. Experiences are triggered by outside stimuli, interpreted in a way that is meaningful within the context of a particular religion, and then behaviorally manifested by an affirmation of faith. So the criteria for having a possible religious experience of a particular system of religion are belief and meaningful stimuli. (Formalized (B & S) → ◊E) I will discuss both components of the antecedent of this sentence to determine the requirements of a religious experience and see how they are applicable to computers. 
II. Religion and the Mind
	Discussion of religion and religious experiences must be centered in a discussion of mind. Religion is what Searle would call a product of social reality. (“Construction of Social Reality”) That is, something that has no basis in nature, but is a construct of the human mind. Products of social reality are maintained by a continued human support structure. No research currently suggests that animals other than humans have religious practices, therefore, it is reasonably safe to assume that religion would not exist without humans. It is also reasonable to assume that religion would not exist within a single isolated human. Here, I am thinking of a situation where a person has never had contact with other humans. Even if such a person had an experience where a god intervened, it is difficult to say how they would interpret the experience. It is a product of organized societies, and it is maintained through social memory, by practices passed on generationally. Religious systems are, therefore, part of Searle’s “Collective Intentionality”. Here, the intentions of the individual are only relevant within the context of the collective. As Searle puts it, “So if I am an offensive lineman playing in a football game, I might be blocking the defensive end, but I am blocking only as part of our executing a pass play.” (“Construction of Social Reality”, 23) A religious experience only makes sense within the context of a particular religion, or by the beliefs of that religious system. Religious systems exist because of the collective beliefs of a group of individuals. 
	Because religion, and, therefore, religious experiences are a product of the mind, and my goal is to determine if it is possible for a computer to have a religious experience, I will be developing my argument around computational theory of mind (CTM). CTM uses aspects of computer science and the psychological school of functionalism to describe the mind. It essentially states that the mind is a product of the functions of the brain. In this way, mental states are defined by physical states, much like a computer, whose system states can be defined by the current moving through certain circuits that are defined by a series of switches called logic gates. The success of CTM bears heavily on fields of artificial intelligence (Ai) mainly because, if the mind can be thought of as a complex computer, then it can be emulated by any other computer.​[1]​ Though CTM is disputed, most notably by Searle, its success is evident in the success of Ai. Since CTM rests on the relationship of humans to computers, it is a good candidate for relating human experience and behavior to computers. 
III. Belief and Physical States
	How does one come to believe something? We are not pre-programmed to believe anything, this seems certain to me. We must develop beliefs. A toddler, for instance, is not born believing that there is a husky man in a red coat that brings him or her gifts at the end of every year based on his or her behavior in the months preceding. This belief is developed through a process of inductive reasoning and cultural conditioning. As a child grows, he or she is told that this figure exists and that he does the things described. The child sees imagery of the character, is told who the character is, goes to sleep on December 24th to an empty living room, and wakes on December 25th to gifts and candy.  These events give justification to the belief in Santa Clause. The truth values of the statements “Santa Clause exists.” and “Santa Clause brings gifts on Christmas Eve.” are irrelevant to the child, because he has faith that Santa Clause exists. Knowledge can be defined as justified true belief. Faith can then be thought of as justified belief that may or may not be actually true. This is tricky because no matter what is actually true, those with faith will assume that their beliefs are true until proven otherwise. 
	Computational theory of mind assumes a soft reductionist view of psychology​[2]​, which means that it can be reduced to the physics of neurology. (Fodor “Mind-Body”) It holds that mental states can be explained or described as physical states. The patterns of neural activity are relevant, because they can then be mapped to computer processes and manipulated by Ai computer programs. Ideally, one should be able to recognize and map a pattern of neural activity, not just a list of random switches to be turned on or off at a given moment. Furthermore, we should know what these switches represent behaviorally, so that they can be manipulated in different ways. What this requires is a Turing Machine chart or program used as part of a finite-state system. It would essentially contain sensory inputs which would move the system into an internal state which processes the input. This might trigger the system to move into a reaction state, which would then be processed and sent to the body as an output. The input and processing states would act as conditionals for the system moving into the reactionary state, which, in turn, would act as a conditional for the output.  
	The primary issue is that we must distinguish behavior based on genuine belief from similar or behaviors that are not genuine or that are based upon an indirect intention. Based on my behavior of going to church, one might conclude that I am a Christian. However, my intention is to please my wife and my actual beliefs lie elsewhere. I am not certain if brain scans could detect this difference. A second issue regarding finite-state automata is called the “Chinese Nation Problem”. CTM and computer science support the thesis that any Universal Turing Machine can realize the program of any other Turing Machine. The thought experiment proposed by Ned Block can be summed up in this way: Imagine that the neurons in your brain were replaced by tiny people who processed the signals, and connected the sensors to fulfill the requirements of the Turing Machine chart for a given mental state. Block uses the mental state of pain in his example. You would function the same, maybe a little slower, but with little difference otherwise. Now imagine that the men did not have to be in your head. They could send and receive signals from your body via radio waves. This system could be realized by any Turing Machine. The system could be transplanted to a calling tree in some country. Block uses China because its population would be sufficient to handle the responsibility of acting as neurons in a brain. Now if the program were executed over the national calling tree in China, would China be in pain? The common-sense answer is “No”, and the example raises some issue about formalizing mental states for computers. (Block)
	Now we must determine how this applies to computers and what computations would be relevant to the process of believing something. The first is a link to memory. Belief must be stored in long-term memory, and called upon at the right time. It is difficult to imagine that there are constant brain states regarding our every belief or disbelief. But, when an image is called upon from memory, our brain must have a state that somehow corresponds to belief of disbelief. The toddler might see a picture of a heavy set man with a red coat and white beard and think, “That is an image of Santa Clause , and I believe that he exists”. Such memories must then be replaced when the toddler gets older to say, “That is an image of Santa Clause, and I no longer believe that he exists”. So memories of certain things must be linked to other memories regarding belief or disbelief, when these memories are called upon and connected the result will be some behavior. In the case of a religious experience, an external event would cause our brains to pull up a memory of the things, perhaps angels, and connect that image to a memory of belief. This, when combined with a reaction to stimuli, would cause the physical behavior of the experience, something like saying a prayer. The matter gets complicated though, with regards to finite-state systems. Using the description above (Stimuli, processing, reaction, output), when one believes something, the system works in a particular way with regards to the processing, reaction, and output. Each of these steps in the system would be determined by the belief of the individual. When something goes from being believed to being disbelieved the algorithm has to change. In other words, belief determines how a mental state will be processed. It provides the rules for interpreting stimuli. Therefore, it is the determining factor each of the other steps in the process from stimuli to output. When we no longer belief something, or begin to believe something we did not before, the system must change. For a computer, this would require an algorithm for modifying its program based on the complex bundle of ideas that determine what it believes. 
IV. Semantics and Computers
	One of the major factors that lie behind religious experience is semantics. To return briefly to the dialogue at the beginning of this essay, it does not matter what the experience is. If a person thinks that a higher being got involved, then it could be classified as a religious experience. The argument relies on semantics in two ways. First, the main argument for the possibility of religious experience states that a phenomenon has to be meaningful, by this I mean religiously meaningful. To state it another way, the person must believe that a deity got involved or explain the experience based on some religious teaching. Second, it seems to me that belief itself has a semantic component. The process of coming to believe something is a matter of being given a hypothesis and then using inductive reasoning to confirm the hypothesis. However, since such hypotheses are not being tested under controlled conditions, we must have a way of telling the difference between relevant and irrelevant observations to use as evidence to confirm the hypothesis. To take the example of Santa Clause, only events that are meaningfully related to the existence of Santa Clause are applied to the confirmation of his existence. Even within the specific subset of presents received on Christmas, the fact that the child gets presents addressed from his or her parents and other family members does not confirm the existence of Santa Clause. Only the fact that there are presents addressed from Santa that were not under the tree on December 24th and were there on December 25th  confirms his existence. A person must distinguish which events are products of divine intervention and which are not. Otherwise you run into a paradox of confirmation.​[3]​ (Hempel, 3-51) Unfortunately for us, and the computer, there are no such criteria. An algorithm cannot, at least at this time, be developed to allow a computer to recognize certain events as being more meaningful than others, since the key factor used in defining the event is ambiguous. 
	Can a computer understand semantics or are they strictly syntax analyzing machines? Entire books have been dedicated to this very question, but I am going to try to sum up the arguments quickly. The most famously resounding, “No”, comes from Searle. In his paper “Minds, Brains and Computers”, he conjures up a thought experiment called the “Chinese Room Argument”. The Chinese room is often used to refute the authenticity of Ai claims. Searle’s thought experiment makes reference to a paper by Alan Turing, which has unofficially set the goal of Ai research for years. Turing’s thought experiment sets up a game similar to the Dating Game, where a contestant asks questions of two “mystery people” One contestant is a person and the other is a computer. The answers are printed on a slip of paper and fed through a window. If the contestant is unable to tell the difference between the computer and the human, we ought to regard the computer as intelligent. (Turing “Computing Machinery”) Searle places himself in the position of the computer. He imagines a situation where he is provided with rules written in a language he understands for responding to queries written in a code language that he does not understand. Over time he is provided with so many rules for response that he is able to fool a native speaker of the code language, Chinese in the example. He then asks if he could be said to understand Chinese.  The common sense answer is, “No, he would not be considered understanding of the language.” This experiment calls into question the authenticity of Ai claims. Even if a computer could simulate output functions related to a possible experience, how would we verify if the computer actually felt what it claimed it did? This issue of authenticity holds similarities to the authenticity problem mentioned earlier in this paper. I think that Searle’s Chinese Room has been most effectively refuted my Margaret Boden, in her paper “Escaping from the Chinese Room”. Her main claim is that Searle has made an inductive leap. Just because computers do not “understand” now does not mean that they will not in the future. The issue, then, becomes to construct tests which would determine if computers genuinely understood. 
V. The Problem of Causation 
	One issue that I have not yet addressed directly is the problem of causation. Since Descartes, the question has been, “Can mental activities cause physical events?” The religious experience must be mental in some capacity. Religion is “real” only in our minds. Religious experiences cause a wide array of physical actions, whether it involves starting or renewing activity with a religious institution or speaking in tongues. Here, computational theory of mind has the edge, for it states that mental events are physical events; therefore, physical events are the cause of physical events. I described this earlier as soft reductionism. Mental events correspond to physical events via neurology. These events could then be described in terms of physics, though this is unnecessary to psychology and philosophy of mind because it fails to describe behavior. This example also mirrors religious experience in that an outside stimulus, coupled with a belief cause a certain behavior. 
	Our beliefs also have a causal relationship with our actions. As Fodor states, 	
	“People commonly attribute behavior to beliefs, to knowledge, and to expectations….Smith 	carries an umbrella because the sky is cloudy, but the weather is only part of the story…The		 clouds affect Smith’s behavior only because he observes them and because they induce in him 	an expectation of rain.” (“Mind-Body”, 114)
My initial argument could not only be stated as a contingent sentence but also as a causal sentence. The belief in religion X coupled with outside stimuli causes religious experience. In order to establish this causal relationship, belief must be explained physically. This assumes that beliefs are real, at least that they can be understood as physical states. There is still some dispute on this; however, many philosophers are willing to defend the realism of belief. Dennett points to the fact that patterns of behavior exist which can be attributed to belief. Assuming that beliefs exist and that they have the power to cause behaviors can allow us to predict behaviors in certain circumstances, such as Fodor’s example above. (“Real Patterns”) The problem is that there are too many psychological factors to accurately predict behavior all the time, and sometimes beliefs can lead to contradictory behaviors. The intention of the action also comes into play. The action of going to church to please my wife might be rooted in a different part of the brain than the action of going to church because I have recently had a near-death experience. Fodor mentions that what is needed is the ability “to show that the type distinct neurological events paired with a given kind of psychological event are identical in respect of whatever properties are relevant to type identification in psychology.” (“Language of Thought”, 18) This means there should be different neurological events associated with the wife pleasing churchgoer and the god pleasing churchgoer. Only further development in neural network mapping and other cognitive sciences will determine if this is the case. 
VI. Conclusions
	Unfortunately, I do not feel that I can  deem the process of believing computational at this time. I have provided a very rough outline for a single situation about believing. It is far from the algorithm that we would need to program a computer to believe something. Let us say that such an algorithm could be concocted. What would it need to include? Memory storage and an ability to connect certain ideas to the concept of belief or disbelief, the ability to discern religiously meaningful events from events that are ordinary, and a belief system are all necessary for the culmination of a religious experience. The first, and probably the most difficult step, would be providing a computer with religious belief. While we all have an idea of what a religion is, and how it functions, the process of determining an analytic definition is like trying to nail Jell-O to a wall. No matter how hard one tries, it just keeps slipping away. There is far too much ambiguity in what constitutes a religion and what criteria are necessary for confirming true belief. Even if it were possible to program a computer to conform to a religious system, we still might not be able to say that the computer believed that system. It would be part of the program, more like reflex or instinct than actual belief. As I have shown, beliefs are developed through a process of inductive reasoning. Beliefs can also change, and when beliefs change the system that processes thoughts in light of those beliefs must also changes. 
	In the beginning of this paper I established that the possibility of having a religious experience was contingent upon the belief in a religious system and a stimulus that could be conceived as religiously meaningful. I have shown that for one to develop a belief they must have experiences which support information provided within a culture. It has yet to be proven that a computer can experience anything. Furthermore, there is currently no culture, in the anthropological sense, to provide a context for experiences. Computers which process input (stimuli) are common. Inexpensive laptops come equipped with a camera, a keyboard and mouse that all link the events in the computer to outside stimuli. Robots are even being developed which can differentiate soft and hard. The issue with the second part of my statement has to do with the semantics. What qualifies something as “religiously meaningful” is ambiguous. Nearly anything could be perceived as an act of a god, and often is. With no set criteria, no program can be developed which would allow a computer to discern meaningful stimuli from that which is devoid of religious significance. Having rendered both of these statements false, I must conclude that a computer cannot currently have a religious experience. I do not dispute that it could be possible in the future, but a myriad of issues in the cognitive and computer sciences must be addressed. And even then, it would be difficult, perhaps impossible to distinguish genuine religious experience from feigned experiences or experiences that were simply a result of following a program.
	My goal, as stated in the introduction of this paper, was to provide an analysis of religious experience in humans to see if it could be mapped onto computers. After establishing a working definition of religious experience, I was able to branch out into religious belief and the semantics of religious experience. I have shown the problems that these two particular issues pose with regards to computational theory of mind. While this is not the only theory of mind, I think that it is a leading contender, particularly when it comes to establishing a link between humans and computers. While the issues of belief, semantics, and CTM have been addressed by many leading philosophers, I have not seen many examples of these problems being used to study a single applied issue such as the ability of a computer to have a religious experience. The goal of Ai is to make computers that can function as humans. Intelligence does not just include the ability to reason and solve problems. It also includes the ability to understand and empathize with other aspects of the human experience, such as art, literature, and religion. A computer’s ability to function in an anthropocentric environment must include the ability to process and, perhaps, experience things as simple as a person’s motivation for going to church. While cognitive and computer scientists have come a long way in developing such technologies, they still have a long way to go in terms of understanding human experiences before such ideas can be properly developed for computers.
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^1	 	This theory is a result of the work of Alan Turing, the father of computer science. His thesis is that any Turing Machine can be emulated by a Universal Turing Machine, the only difference being in the speed of processing. He used this thesis to create a hypothetical machine which could solve math problems by carrying out and repeating the steps of relatively simple algorithms. (Turing and Petzold)
^2	 	 I am describing it as a “soft reductionist” view because as far as I can tell it does not state that psychological processes can be described in the language of physics. See Fodor “Language of Thought” (9-25) for his refutation of reductionism, but basically calculating the velocity of the electrical charge or the energy released when a neuron fires would tell us nothing about behaviors or mental activities. CTM hopes to map brain patterns to behavior; the actual physics of the brain activities are irrelevant to the field of study.
^3	 	 I am referring of course to Carl G. Hempel’s raven's paradox on the theory of confirmation. Here the statement “All ravens are black” can be verified by the existence of any non-black non-raven. 
